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Non-technical summary
A common finding in the international literature on immigrants’ language proficiency on labor
market outcomes is a positive effect on earnings. An open question so far is, whether this is due
to a direct effect of language proficiency, or whether there is an indirect effect only through the
choice of better paid jobs. Put it in other words, are immigrants with better language proficiency
paid better in a firm than immigrants with poorer language command or do they earn different
wages because they work in different firms and do different jobs?
In this paper, we answer this question by analyzing the effect of language proficiency on earnings for
foreigners in Germany using data from GSOEP. The empirical analysis, motivated by a theoretical
model, considers the effect of language proficiency on four possible stages of self-selection in the
labor market. The first two stages comprise the decision to participate in the labor market and the
employment decision. Persons who are employed further select themselves into economic sectors
and occupation, i.e. the second two stages of self-selection. Concerning economic sectors we
differentiate between basic and high-tech industry/manufacturing and other sectors; concerning
occupation between white- and blue-collar occupations.
The results show that foreigners with better language command have a significantly higher par-
ticipation rate and employment chances. Moreover, better language proficiency leads to higher
probability of working in white-collar occupations. Once, all these selection mechanisms are con-
trolled for, we do not find any direct effect of language proficiency on earnings. Instead, without
controlling for selection one observes a significant positive effect of language proficiency on earnings.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die internationale Literatur zum Einfluss der Sprachfa¨higkeit von Immigranten auf die Arbeits-
marktintegration zeigt einen positiven Effekt auf das Einkommen, d.h. eine bessere Sprachfa¨higkeit
fu¨hrt im Durchschnitt zu einem ho¨heren Einkommen. Eine offene Frage in diesem Zusammen-
hang ist, ob die Sprachfa¨higkeit direkt auf den Verdienst wirkt oder ob lediglich die Wahl der
Bescha¨ftigung beeinflusst wird. Anders ausgedru¨ckt: Verdienen Immigranten mit besseren Sprach-
fa¨higkeiten bei ansonsten vergleichbaren Eigenschaften mehr Geld im gleichen Beruf, oder selek-
tieren sie sich in besser bezahlte Bescha¨ftigungsverha¨ltnisse?
Diese Studie beantwortet diese Frage anhand der Untersuchung des Einflusses der Sprachfa¨higkeit
von Ausla¨ndern auf ihren Arbeitsverdienst in Deutschland mit Daten des Sozioo¨konomischen Pan-
els. In der empirischen Analyse werden hierzu vier Stufen der Selbstselektion beru¨cksichtigt:
Erstens, ob die Person u¨berhaupt eine Bescha¨ftigung sucht. Sollte dies der Fall sein, gibt es
zweitens die Mo¨glichkeit, dass die Person bescha¨ftigt oder arbeitslos ist. Sollte die Person einer
Bescha¨ftigung nachgehen, so ko¨nnen als dritte und vierte Stufe die unterschiedlichen Wirtschafts-
bereiche (z.B. Industrie) und die verschiedenen Arbeitsverha¨ltnisse (z.B. Arbeiter und Angestellte)
identifiziert werden.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Personen mit besseren Sprachfa¨higkeiten mit einer signifikant ho¨heren
Wahrscheinlichkeit am Arbeitsmarkt partizipieren und auch eher eine Bescha¨ftigung finden. Des
Weiteren erho¨hen bessere Sprachfa¨higkeiten die Wahrscheinlichkeit, in einem Angestelltenverha¨ltnis
bescha¨ftigt zu werden. Wenn man alle Selektionsstufen beru¨cksichtigt, so zeigt die Sprachfa¨higkeit
keinen statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf das Einkommen, ein direkter Effekt ist also nicht nach-
weisbar. Dies ist ein wichtiges, neues Ergebnis, da der gescha¨tzte Effekt ohne die Selektionskon-
trolle – wie in der Literatur beschrieben – hingegen signifikant positiv ist.
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1 Introduction
A core topic of the migration literature are earnings’ differentials between immigrants and natives
that have been explored in numerous studies since the seminal paper of Chiswick (1978). A well-
established finding of many studies is that migrants’ earnings lack behind those of the equally-
qualified and experienced native population. In addition, catching up at a later stage depending
on the duration of residence is documented in the literature leading to the so-called assimilation
hypothesis. One explanation for the gap in earnings between foreigners and natives is language
deficiency of the immigrants that may hamper productivity. From a policy perspective, language
effect is interesting as language learning could be stimulated through language courses or similar
activities. Consequently, the impact of immigrants’ language ability on earnings has been studied
by many authors. Whereas some early studies, see, e.g., Carliner (1981) or Reimers (1983; 1985),
could not establish significant positive effects of language proficiency on earnings, the majority
of later studies revised that finding presenting clear positive effects, see, e.g., McManus, Gould,
and Welch (1983), Tainer (1988), Dustmann (1994), or Chiswick and Miller (1995).1 Given these
studies are not directly comparable due to differences with respect to the analyzed questions, the
formulation of the estimation equations and sample selection criteria, makes this common positive
effect of language on earnings even more remarkable.
Despite the large number of studies on language effects on earnings, the context of employment
or job type have been scarcely considered. McManus, Gould, and Welch (1983) argue that if
economy consisted of one-person producing units and impersonal products, communication would
have no effect on earnings. If, alternatively, products were personal, so that the value of the
service may depend on a producer’s ability to communicate and convey the product to a consumer,
communication ability would affect earnings. More practically, Kossoudji (1988) argues that jobs
are extremely heterogenous in their use of language. Although communication is necessary in most
jobs, its contribution to productivity clearly varies by occupation. In a similar vein, Tainer (1988)
argues that language proficiency is an important communication factor, and communication is a
vital aspect of any job. For that reason, language deficiency could, on the one hand, prevent
someone from getting a job. On the other hand, even if the person finds a job, it could be below
the skill level depending on the degree of the deficiency and the communication skills of the co-
workers. Nevertheless, characteristics of occupation are not regarded in the majority of studies
and earnings are used to reflect the communication inability.
An early attempt to include occupation is given by Kossoudji (1988) who explicitly analyzes the
effect of language on occupation-specific earnings and occupational mobility in the US. Language
ability is measured in terms of English language deficiency. Estimating a mixed simultaneous
1 Further studies establishing positive effects, amongst others, are Grenier (1984), Kossoudji (1988), Rivera-Batiz
(1990), Chiswick (1991), Chiswick and Miller (1999), Dustmann (1999), Dustmann and van Soest (2001), Dustmann
and van Soest (2002), Shields and Price (2002), Berman, Lang, and Siniver (2003), and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003).
Chiswick and Miller (1995) provide a comparison for adult male immigrants (aged 25-64 years) in Australia, the
United States, Canada, and Israel. For all countries they find significant positive effects of host-country-language
fluency, with the largest effect for the United States.
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model the results indicate that English language deficiency has no effect on earnings in either of
the two highest productivity occupations (managers and professionals). The explanation provided
by the author is that immigrant professionals may possess unique skills highly demanded in the
labor market that employers are willing to ignore language deficiencies. With regards to other
occupations English language deficiency alters access to jobs. Very recently, Chiswick and Miller
(2007a) pick up the topic for the US again. They argue that occupation provides information
about the channels through which earnings gains are achieved. Similar to education, language can
be viewed as having both direct and indirect effects on earnings, where indirect effects operate via
occupational attainment. In their empirical analysis, they include occupations as further regressors
in the earnings equation, implicitly assuming that occupation is independent of language usage.
Their results show that inclusion of occupation reduces the earnings gap, and the effect is strongest
for the low-skilled. In that sense, the authors conclude that some of the earnings disadvantage of
the immigrants could be attributed to their occupational choice.
Further reasons may complicate the evaluation of the impact of language proficiency on earnings.
On the one hand, the endogeneity of language proficiency of immigrants may induce further issues
of self-selection beyond occupational choice. Time of residence and age at migration may affect
language proficiency (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2004) in a way that persons who stayed longer in
the host country accumulate better language skills and, therefore, earn higher wages.2 Moreover,
language proficiency may depend on country of origin (e.g., Espenshade and Fu, 1997) or linguistic
distance (e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 2007b; Beenstock, Chiswick, and Repetto, 2001). This indi-
cates that we would expect language proficiency not only have an impact on earnings, but also
on the selection processes in the labor market. Ignoring these impacts may lead to biased esti-
mates. On the other hand, interpretation of the effects of language proficiency on earnings could
be hampered due to measurement or misclassification errors in the language proficiency variable.
Dustmann and van Soest (2001; 2002) analyze the bias due to time-varying and time-persistent
misclassification errors in self-reported language indicators in German data.3 The results show
that potential measurement errors lead to downward biased estimates of coefficients of language
proficiency on earnings in that sense that individuals over-report their language abilities. Control-
ling for this leads to larger effects of language proficiency on earnings and also to a higher standard
deviation. Charette and Meng (1994) examine the nature and potential measurement error result-
ing from self-assessed measure of literacy using Canadian data including subjective and objective
measures of literacy. Their results show that the measurement error in the self-assessed literacy
variable does not have a serious effect on the estimates of the wage determination equation.
The study at hand contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. Based on a theo-
retical model that provides a link between language proficiency and the various selection processes
in the labor market, individuals with better language skills are more likely to participate and to
be employed even in the absence of a language premium in wages. In the empirical analysis, we
2 It should be noted that Beenstock, Chiswick, and Paltiel (2005) reject this so-called Immigration Assimilation
Hypothesis.
3 A similar analysis is provided by Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) using data for the UK.
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explicitly regard these different selection processes. Namely, we take account of self-selection into
participation as well as of self-selection into employment. In addition, more proficient individuals
could be expected to end up working in higher-paying firms or in higher-paid occupations. There-
fore, we extend the model to estimate the effect of language proficiency on earnings regarding
additional patterns of self-selection into economic sector and occupation, which is a major differ-
ence to the previous literature. In contrast to Chiswick and Miller (2007a) who regard occupation
as a further regressor, we take account of the potential endogeneity due to language proficiency by
including a further selection equation. Moreover, we extend the set-up of the analyses of Kossoudji
(1988) and Chiswick and Miller (2007a) by considering selection processes prior to occupation as
well. In addition, besides occupation we also take account of economic sector choice that has not
been done before. To consider skill heterogeneity and capture the potential relationship between
language proficiency and skill-level, we estimate skill-specific effects. Finally, by addressing these
issues we add to the scarce literature on effects of occupation (so far available only for the US)
with first results for Germany.4
The empirical analysis is based on data from GSOEP. To mitigate problems of measurement error in
the language proficiency variable, we use information on language usage in the household as a proxy
for individual language command, which supposedly suffers less from measurement error than the
self-reported language proficiency information. To test the sensitivity of the results we also present
the estimates using the self-assessed language proficiency variable. In that sensitivity analysis, we
use language usage in the household and time of residence as instruments to capture measurement
error. The estimates are robust irrespective to which variable is used to approximate language
proficiency. The results show that language proficiency significantly increases participation and
employment probability of foreigners in Germany. Moreover, earnings are clearly higher for persons
speaking mainly or at least partly German in the household compared to people using mainly
their native language. When additional selection into economic sector and type of occupation
is considered, foreigners with better language proficiency appear more likely to be white-collar
workers. With regards to earnings, once selection into occupation and economic sector is taken
into account, no significant effect of language usage on earnings for blue-collar workers can be
observed. For white-collar workers no conclusive evidence is found.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the estimation strategy starting with the
outline of a theoretical model with flat wages within each firm and the econometric methodology
afterwards. Details on the data and some selected descriptives are given in section 3. The empirical
estimates of the effects of language usage on the selection processes and earnings are discussed in
section 4. In addition, details of the sensitivity analysis using different measures of language
4 There are number of studies exploring the effects of language usage on earnings in Germany. Dustmann (1994),
e.g., analyzes the determinants of German language ability and the effects on earnings testing the assimilation
hypothesis. However, he addresses potential self-selection bias for women only and neglects potential occurrence
for men. In addition, Dustmann (1999) studies the incentives to invest in language capital conditional on the
expected duration of stay, i.e. comparing temporary and permanent immigration. Finally, Dustmann and van
Soest (2001; 2002) focus on the potential bias of estimates due to measurement or misclassification errors. All
studies establish positive effects of language on earnings but self-selection with regards to the stages discussed here
is not regarded.
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proficiency are provided. The final section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation strategy
2.1 Theoretical background
Assuming language proficiency to be related to productivity and through this affecting earnings,
participation and employment, a useful theoretical framework for analyzing the central question
of the paper is given by a variant of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model (see also Manning,
2003, and Mortensen, 2003). This model provides argumentation for controlling for self-selection
even if an employer pays the same wage for workers with different language abilities.
Consider an economy consisting of three types of individuals with productivities p0, p1, and p2,
such that p0 < p1 < p2. Suppose that there is a guaranteed minimal income b (for example
welfare assistance or minimum wage). The lowest possible wage a firm can set is thus b. Suppose
that p0 < b. This implies that no firm employs individuals with productivity p0 and they do not
participate. Assume the inflow of job offers to unemployed workers happens in continuous time
according to a stationary Poisson process so that each worker receives only one offer at maximum
during an infinitesimal short time interval. Employed workers may search on the job for higher
paid vacancies. The arrival rates of job offers to employed and unemployed workers are assumed
to be equal. Since the arrival rates are the same for out-of-job and on-the-job search, it is optimal
for a worker to accept the first offer he receives and to continue searching on the job for a better
offer (if returns to search are higher than the search costs). As a result in equilibrium there will
still be a fraction of highly productive workers employed at low-wage firms.
For simplicity, suppose further that there is a flat wage policy in any firm, so that a firm that hires
both p1 and p2 workers pays equal wages to them. A firm offering a wage lower than p1 can hire
both p1 and p2 individuals, but a firm with a wage above p1 can hire only p2 workers. Consider an
arbitrary firm 1, which offers a wage equal to b and has a profit of pi1 = (p1−b)L1(p1)+(p2−b)L1(p2),
where L1(p1) is the labor supply of p1 workers to firm 1 and L1(p2) is the labor supply of p2 workers
to firm 1. A firm 2, offering a wage w greater than p1, has a profit of pi2 = (p2 − w)L2(p2), where
L2(p2) is the labor supply of p2 workers to firm 2. Then, as in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model, there exists an equilibrium such that both firms are equally profitable. Firm 2 pays a
higher wage, but at the same time has a larger workforce of p2 workers as it would “steal away”
some of the workers from firm 1 attracted by a higher wage. Ultimately, more p2 workers would
be concentrated in high-wage firms.
The model implies that even in the presence of a flat wage policy within a firm, the observed wages
in the sample between p1 and p2 workers would be different due to differences in employment
probabilities. When estimating the effect of p on wages one has to keep in mind that p1 workers
are more likely to be unemployed than p2 workers. Moreover, participation rates differ with p
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as p0 individuals do not participate. This implies that the estimated effect of p on wages based
on the sample of employed individuals is biased as the sample of employed wage-earners is self-
selected and a distribution of p in a sample of employed individuals is not a correct estimate of
the distribution of p in the population.
2.2 Econometric model and selection issues
Suppose that worker’s productivity cannot be observed by a firm, but a firm knows that language
proficiency is related to productivity as
p = ψ(H) + υ, (1)
where H is language proficiency, ψ is some arbitrary function and υ includes other factors affecting
productivity including a random component. Language proficiency then signals the potential
productivity.
The theoretical model is constructed in such a way to allow a flat-wage policy, i.e. a firm pays
the same wage to workers with different productivities. In reality, this would mean that firms pay
the same wage independent of language proficiency. The rationale is although persons with better
language proficiency are more productive, on average paying different wages based on language
spoken may be deemed overtly discriminatory. Nevertheless, sorting with respect to employment
might be present.
Thereby, we would expect a higher participation probability and higher employment chances of
foreigners with a better command of German language in case of an equal pay policy within firms.
On the other hand, according to theory, there is a critical level of productivity for participation,
b. Persons with productivity below this value do not participate. Therefore, the participating
individuals with a good language command could have lower values of υ as higher values of H
compensate for this to reach the critical level of productivity. Alternatively higher values of υ may
compensate lower values of H. Moreover, one needs to keep in mind that the most productive
workers are more likely to be employed in high-paid firms raising out another source of self-selection.
In the theoretical model above it was shown that participating and employed individuals may be
non-random samples of the population. Thus, to estimate the earnings equation we have to control
for self-selection modeling participation and employment decision simultaneously. The approach
could be interpreted as a variant of the classical Heckman-Lee method, following Heckman (1976)
and Lee (1976), that is applied when one source of self-selection is present. In our case, we have to
regard two sources (participation and employment) in a first step, requiring certain adjustments
that are discussed below. Here, the participation equation is given as:
I∗1 = Z1γ1 + 1, (2)
where Z1 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ1 is a parameter vector, and 1 is a random com-
ponent. I∗1 is latent, instead we observe I1 = 1 (in case of participation) if wR > b and I1 = 0
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(in case of nonparticipation) otherwise where wR denotes the reservation wage. The employment
equation is specified analogously as:
I∗2 = Z2γ2 + 2, (3)
where Z2 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ2 is a parameter vector, and 2 is a random compo-
nent. I∗2 is latent, instead we observe I2 = 1 (in case of employment) if w > wR and I2 = 0 (for
unemployed individuals) otherwise. Both I∗1 and I∗2 depend on the reservation wage. If Z1 and Z2
contain all variables which determine wR, 1 and 2 are independent. If some of these variables
are not observed (or not contained) in the data they will be included in the error term, which
could result in the correlation between 1 and 2. Hence, it might be advisable to allow for this
correlation and estimate equations 2 and 3 jointly.
Finally, the wage offer equation is of a standard Becker-Mincer type, w = Xβ + u, where w is
the log wage, X is a matrix of exogenous variables, β is a parameter vector, and u is an error
component, which is normally distributed with mean zero. Wages are observed if both I1 = 1 and
I2 = 1. Hence, expected observed wage is given by:
E(w|I1 = 1, I2 = 1) = Xβˆ + E(u|I1 = 1, I2 = 1). (4)
Define the covariance between the error terms of the participation and the earnings equation as
σu1 = cov(u, 1), and analogously between employment and earnings σu2 = cov(u, 2). Moreover,
let var(u) = σ2u. In order to estimate the selection model, variances of the error terms have to be
standardized as var(1) = var(2) = 1 and cov(1, 2) = ρ1. Following Mohanty (2001) (see also
Maddala, 1983), E(u|I1 = 1, I2 = 1) = σu1λ1 + σu2λ2, where λ1 = φ(Z1γ1)Φ(A)/F (Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1)
and λ2 = φ(Z2γ2)Φ(B)/F (Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1), A = (Z2γ2 − ρ1 · Z1γ1)/
√
(1− ρ21), B = (Z1γ1 − ρ1 ·
Z2γ2)/
√
(1− ρ21). φ is the univariate standard normal density function, Φ is the univariate stan-
dard normal distribution function, and F is the bivariate standard normal distribution function.
It is worth noting that the λ’s are the inverse Mill’s ratios adjusted for the bivariate case. In fact,
if participation and employment decisions are unrelated, i.e. if ρ1 is not statistically significant,
then F (Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1) = Φ(A) · Φ(B) (conditional probability of independent events) and hence
λ1 = φ(Z1γ1)/Φ(Z1γ1) and λ2 = φ(Z2γ2)/Φ(Z2γ2), which are the inverse Mill’s ratios in a standard
two-stage Heckit model (see Heckman, 1979).
The conditional wage in equation 4 can be rewritten as:
E(w|X) = Xβˆ + λ1σu1 + λ2σu2. (5)
To estimate equation 5, in a first step equations 2 and 3 have to be estimated jointly. Estimates
obtained at the first stage (γ1, γ2, ρ1) are used to construct λ1 and λ2 as defined above. At the
second stage, wage is regressed on X, λ1 and λ2 by OLS which produces the parameter estimates
of β, σu1, and σu2.
The theoretical model attributes a higher probability of better jobs to workers with a higher produc-
tivity. Consequently, even having controlled for self-selection into participation and employment,
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earnings may be affected by worker’s occupation and economic sector choice (in the subsample of
employed individuals). In the empirical analysis, we take account of self-selection into economic
sector modeled as the probability of working in basic or high tech industry and manufacturing and
of self-selection into occupation modeled as the probability of being a qualified/highly-qualified
white-collar worker. Analogously to the basic model, both choices have to be considered as joint
decisions in a first step. Assuming joint normality of the errors, estimation is carried out using a
bivariate probit model. However, since the participation-employment decision is a double-hurdle,
i.e. the employment decision is observed only for participating individuals and is a precondition
for occupational and economic sector choice, this has to be regarded in the estimation procedure.
A detailed explanation is given in appendix A.
3 Data and selected descriptives
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from eight waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) for the years 1996 to 2005 excluding 2002 and 2004 due to missing information on the
variable of interest (language usage at home). GSOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudi-
nal study of private households carried out since 1984 in Germany. It provides information about
all household members covering Germans, foreigners and recent immigrants to Germany. In 2005,
there were almost 12,000 households and more than 21,000 persons sampled in GSOEP. An ad-
vantage of GSOEP is that it contains an over-sample of migrants to provide a sufficient data base
for statistical analyses of the immigrant minorities.
For homogeneity reasons, we impose some restrictions on the sample. First, we use only data
on male foreigners in West Germany who have a personal migration experience (first generation
immigrants). Foreigners who arrived before 1948 are not considered. Second, we only regard
persons from so-called guest worker countries. We define persons as guest workers if their country
of origin is one of the traditional German recruiting countries from the mid-1950s to 1970s.5 The
countries comprised by our sample are: Turkey (48 percent), Former Yugoslavia (11 percent),
Greece (11 percent), Italy (23 percent), Spain (7 percent) and Portugal (1 percent). These persons
are a large group of all foreigners in Germany (about 80 percent). Moreover, guest workers seem
to be more homogeneous a group by definition. On the one hand, we exclude persons who came
as refugees, e.g., from Africa or the Middle East, and, on the other hand, we exclude persons who
came from highly advanced countries like the U.S., Western and Northern Europe, or Austria.
Third, the analysis takes account of people aged 25 to 55 years to avoid bias due to education or
early retirement decisions (those in education are explicitly discarded from our data). In addition,
we exclude individuals who do not report the language usage in the household from the sample
5 The goal of the guest worker program was to solve labor supply shortages in West Germany in the industrial
sector that emerged during the strong economic development of that time.
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(less than 2 percent). Finally, information on wages is symmetrically two percent trimmed to
exclude extreme values.
Variables for language proficiency may be prone to measurement error due to self-assessment of
the respondents in many surveys. For example, Dustmann and van Soest (2001; 2002) show that
reliability of the self-assessed language proficiency variable in GSOEP may be limited in terms of
inter-personal and intra-personal comparability.6 In addition, in about half of the observations self-
assessed language proficiency is missing in our sample. Language usage at home of the respondents
contains of three categories: 1) speaking mainly German, 2) speaking partly German and partly
the mother tongue, or 3) speaking mainly the language of the home country. As it could be
expected that reporting the type of the language used in the household is easier than assessing
language proficiency in terms of written or oral skills, we suppose the variable to be less prone to
measurement errors.
Raw descriptive statistics reveal a strong relationship between self-assessed language proficiency
and language usage in the household, suggesting that language spoken in the household could be a
good proxy for language proficiency. For example, 51 percent of people who speak mainly German
at home report to have very good speaking ability (in German) and more than 90 percent report
at least good speaking ability. More than 60 percent of those who speak partly German at home
report to have at least good speaking ability and over 30 percent report satisfactory speaking
ability. Persons speaking mainly mother tongue at home mostly report satisfactory (about 45%)
and poor (about 30%) speaking ability. Although these descriptive statistics tend to support the
use of language usage as a proxy for self-assessed language proficiency, differences in interpretation
may remain. For that reason, we check the robustness of the results by estimating the effects of
self-assessed language proficiency in section 4.4.
Even with the information on labor market states of non-participation, employment and unem-
ployment of GSOEP at hand, modeling the two-stage self-selection process requires some further
treatment of the variables. Respondents are asked two separate questions, whether they are reg-
istered unemployed and whether they are non-participants. However, non-participation is not
necessarily understood by respondents as being out of the labor market in an economic sense
(some people mix up non-participation and registered unemployment). For that reason, we de-
fine people as non-participants if they responded not in the labor market and not registered as
unemployed simultaneously. It has to be noted that this group may still include some active par-
ticipants who are not registered at the labor office.7 A further complication could arise from the
fact that respondents do not necessarily understand employment and unemployment as exclusive
labor market states. For example, a person having a low-paid job8 is eligible for receiving addi-
tional subsistence allowance. Officially registered unemployed are allowed to hold a minor job or
work part-time and earn up to a certain threshold. In the empirical application, unemployed peo-
ple who are registered at the labor office but earn more than 1,000 Euro per month are counted as
6 The language spoken in the household is also not free from inter-personal variation.
7 Potential reasons could be, for example, expiration of unemployment benefits eligibility or benefit sanctions.
8 with earnings below the subsistence level
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employed. The outcome variable (real gross hourly wage) is obtained for all employees by dividing
the gross earnings in the month prior to the interview by the reported working hours of the last
week that are extrapolated to monthly hours. Wages are deflated using the consumption price
index based on the year 2000 to get real consumption wages of comparable purchasing power.9
In GSOEP, foreigners could leave the sample for two reasons. First, there is some common panel
mortality, i.e. persons decide not to participate in subsequent interviews or they change their place
of residence and interviewers lose track of them. Second, foreigners could be naturalized. As
there is considerable return migration from Germany this may cause non-random panel attrition.
Dustmann and van Soest (2002) have analyzed the extent with respect to language ability and
earnings. Their results show no significant estimates neither on language ability nor on earnings.
Therefore, we could assume panel mortality to be random. In contrast, naturalization could
be expected to be non-random. Performing distribution tests of equality of language usage for
nationality changers and non-changers showed no significant differences. Overall about 5 percent
from our sample of foreigners changed nationality (76 persons out of 1,282). Hence, we refrain
from controlling for selection into German citizenship explicitly in the analysis. Persons who were
naturalized are not considered in the estimations after the date of naturalization.
3.2 Selected descriptives
Before presenting the empirical application and the estimation results, it is useful to take a closer
look at the data available. Table 1 provides means of selected variables used in the empirical
model with a distinction between non-participants (first column), persons who participate but
are not employed (second column) and employed persons (third column). Instead of discussing
the single figures in the table, we will concentrate on findings that are of primary interest for
our analysis. Although we use language usage in the household in the empirical analysis, we
additionally include self-assessed language proficiency for comparison. First, compared to the
other groups employed individuals are more likely to speak mainly German at home. Whereas
about 32 percent of the employed persons speak German in the household, the shares in the group
of non-participants are 22 percent and in the group of the unemployed 14 percent only. Vice versa,
non-participants (38 percent) and unemployed persons (44 percent) speak mainly their mother
tongue at home compared to the employed (22 percent). With respect to self-assessed language
proficiency the picture is similar. As about 63 percent of the employed persons report a good or
very good proficiency this group tends to have a clearly better command of German language than
unemployed persons (42 percent) or non-participants (54 percent). All in all, employed persons
report a better language ability than the other groups.
A major determinant of productivity is skill level. We consider it in the analysis in three different
categories. Low-skilled are people who lack professional training. This group could be expected
9 It should be noted that the reported gross earnings in the month prior to the interview have not been adjusted
for end-of-year bonuses, overtime-payments, holiday allowances etc.
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Tab. 1: Means of selected variables
Part.=0 Part. =1
Emp.=0 Emp.=1
Language usage in the household
Mainly German 0.22 0.14 0.32
Mainly mother tongue 0.38 0.44 0.22
Partly German 0.40 0.42 0.46
Self-assessed language proficiency
Very good 0.22 0.09 0.21
Good 0.32 0.33 0.42
Satisfactory 0.32 0.38 0.28
Poor 0.12 0.19 0.10
Not at all 0.02 0.01 0.00
Level of education
Low skilled 0.60 0.66 0.51
Medium skilled 0.35 0.28 0.41
High skilled 0.05 0.06 0.08
Socio-demographic variables
Age 38.79 41.41 39.18
Time of residence 22.89 22.78 23.55
Married 0.75 0.83 0.86
Child 0.80 0.75 0.78
Economic sector
Manufacturing – – 0.65
Transportation – – 0.05
Construction – – 0.13
Trading services – – 0.14
Social services and health – – 0.03
Firm size
fewer than 20 employees – – 0.18
20-199 employees – – 0.28
200-1999 employees – – 0.32
2000 and more employees – – 0.20
Observations 255 290 2,285
Part.=Participation; Emp.=Employment; – not available
to be most strongly disadvantaged in the labor market, in particular in a high-developed country
with a regulated labor market as Germany. Medium-skilled comprise people who completed a
professional training (not necessarily in the German apprenticeship system, but comparable to
it). Finally, high-skilled persons are those who graduated from advanced technical college (Fach-
hochschule) or university. The shares of the low-skilled are particularly large in the group of
non-participants (60 percent) and the group of unemployed persons (66 percent). In contrast,
the share is lower in the group of employed persons (51 percent) but still considerable. With
regard to the socio-demographic characteristics further heterogeneity could be obtained. The non-
participants are, on average, about half a year younger than the employed; unemployed persons,
in contrast, are more than two years older than the employed. The time of residence is compa-
rable between groups but employed persons have lived in Germany longer than the other groups.
Finally, taking a look at the economic sectors and firm sizes of the employed persons shows that
the majority works in manufacturing, trading services and construction and more than half are
employed at firms with at least 200 employees.
The last point we want to present descriptively is the correlation between language ability and
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Tab. 2: Distribution of language ability across skill
groups
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
Language usage in the household
Mainly German 0.24 0.34 0.43
Partly German 0.32 0.20 0.18
Mainly mother tongue 0.45 0.46 0.39
Self-assessed language proficiency
Very Good 0.14 0.25 0.31
Good 0.38 0.44 0.31
Satisfactory 0.34 0.22 0.30
Poor 0.13 0.08 0.07
Not at all 0.00 0.01 0.01
level of education (Table 2). In general, language ability increases with the skill level. Low-
skilled persons show the lowest language proficiency irrespective if it is measured by language
usage or self-reported ability. High-skilled workers have higher variance in self-reported language
ability compared to medium-skilled. While more high-skilled workers report very good language
ability this is also true for satisfactory language ability, which could imply that high-skilled are
too heterogeneous a group.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Participation and employment
To answer the question what impact language ability has on foreigners’ earnings, we will start our
discussion with the effects of language proficiency on the decisions on participation and employ-
ment. As shown in the set-up of the empirical model, individual’s decisions on participation and
employment may be correlated. Hence, in a first step we estimate both decisions jointly using full-
information maximum likelihood. For identification purposes not to solely rely on distributional
assumptions, we choose marital status (married) and children (children) as the exclusion restric-
tions that enter the participation equation, but not the employment equation. Marital status has
a statistically significant effect, thereby, justifying the choice of exclusion variables. The correla-
tion between the errors was statistically insignificant and, therefore, we estimate both equations
separately.
The variables of language usage are included in both equations. Effects are estimated with dummies
for speaking mainly German language and for speaking partly German language at home relative
to speaking mother tongue (the reference group). Moreover, to improve explanatory power, a
number of socio-economic variables are added into the models. In particular, person’s age and time
of residence (i.e. the years the individual lives in Germany) as well as the squares are considered
in both equations. We do not include immigration cohort effects in the model as they are a
perfect linear combination of age, time of residence and year dummies. Therefore, we refrain
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from interpreting effects of age or time of residence as we cannot identify them separately from
cohort effects. It should be noted that the effect of language proficiency is unaffected by the
exclusion of cohort effects. Those are absorbed in the parameter estimates for the constant term.
As productivity is closely related to qualification, we estimate the effect of medium- or high-
qualification in reference to low-qualification.
Another issue, which one has to deal with, are differences in requirements of language proficiency
across jobs. It may be possible that low-skilled workers mainly supplying manual labor are less
likely to need a good language command in order to perform their tasks, unlike their high-skilled
counterparts who need the language of the host country on a daily basis for communication and
decision-making. For that reason we interact language usage with skill dummies. As a result the
effect of language usage on earnings for each skill group is a sum of the coefficients of language usage
and the respective skill dummy. The effects of language usage on participation and employment
across skill groups are given in Table 3.10 The estimates of the language variables clearly point
towards a positive effect of usage of the host country’s language on both the decision to participate
in the labor market and the employment chances. Although the coefficients in the table cannot
be interpreted as marginal effects, it becomes obvious from the relative scale that speaking mainly
German has an even stronger effect than using it only partly. Surprisingly, no significant effect is
found for high skilled workers. However, given that the share of non-participants and unemployed
among the high skilled is only about 5%, the overall number of high skilled workers is relatively
low in the sample, and given possible heterogeneity of this group one should be cautious in inter-
preting insignificance as non-existence of the effect. The scale of the point estimates supports this
argument.11
Tab. 3: Language usage effects on participation and em-
ployment across skill groups
participationa
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German 0.3511∗ 0.6010# 0.7771∗
partly German 0.3248# 0.3277∗∗ 0.5769
employmentb
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German 0.5653# 0.9404# 0.1461
partly German 0.3193∗∗ 0.4711# -0.0576
# - significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at
10% level
a The complete estimates are given in Table B.1 (first column) in the
appendix.
b The complete estimates are given in Table B.1 (second column) in the
appendix.
With regard to other variables (see Table B.1 in the appendix), most findings are in line with
the expectations. Considering the level of education, medium-skilled people experience a higher
10 The complete estimates are given in Table B.1 in the appendix.
11 At this point, one should bear in mind that with respect to language ability high-skilled workers are more
heterogeneous a group (see Table 2) than the other skill groups.
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propensity to participate than the low-skilled. Maybe due to the small number of foreigners who
are high-skilled and possible heterogeneity of this group, estimations do not provide evidence that
those differ in their behavior from the low-skilled in terms of participation.
4.2 Impact of language usage on earnings
Having established selection patterns into participation and employment conditional on language
usage, we want to analyze the effects on earnings in the next step. As a starting point we estimate
the effects of language usage on earnings without controlling for self-selection. These results are
summarized in the upper panel of Table 4.12 Without controlling for selection, foreigners speaking
mainly German earn about 5 percent more than foreigners speaking their mother tongue at home.
For high skilled workers the gap is as large as 39 percent. Speaking partly German has a significant
effect for high skilled and is smaller in magnitude (about 17 percent compared to speaking mother
tongue).
Tab. 4: Language usage effects on earnings across skill
groups
Earnings (no selection control)a
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German 0.0531∗ 0.0709∗∗ 0.3857#
partly German -0.0226 0.0525∗ 0.1706∗∗
Earnings (employment,
participation selection)b
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German 0.0750 0.0855 0.3618#
partly German -0.0171 0.0617∗ 0.1431∗
# - significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at
10% level
a The complete estimates are given in Table B.2 (model 1) in the ap-
pendix.
b The complete estimates are given in Table B.2 (model 2) in the ap-
pendix.
To consider self-selection of participation and employment, we calculate both inverse Mill’s ratios
based on the results from Table B.1. As shown in the set-up of the econometric model (section
2.2) both terms are plugged into the earnings equation as additional regressors. The correspond-
ing estimates of the effects of language usage are summarized in the lower panel of Table 4.13
Controlling for selection into participation and employment increases the earnings gap between
foreigners speaking mainly German and foreigners speaking mainly their mother tongue by about
2 percentage points for the low skilled and by about 1.5 percentage points for the medium-skilled.
In contrast, the effect for the high-skilled is reduced by about 2.5 percentage points.
These results so far point out at a wage premium for language proficiency even controlling for
selection into participation and employment. This result is not new and has already been discussed
12 Complete results are given in model 1 of Table B.2 in the appendix.
13 Model 2 of Table B.2 in the appendix contains the complete estimation results.
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in the literature. For example, Dustmann (1994) notes a 7.3 percent wage increase for males who
report to have good or very good writing abilities in German. Chiswick and Miller (1999) report
higher wages by about 8 percent for migrant males who are proficient in both speaking and reading
English using the 1989 Legalized Population Survey (LPS) for the United States. For Great Britain
Shields and Price (2002) establish that language fluency increases the mean occupational wage by
about 16.5 percent. Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005) find out that immigrants who are proficient
in English have 19 percent higher earnings than those with limited English language skills using
the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia 1993-1995. For Israel Berman, Lang, and
Siniver (2003) predict a 23 percent earnings’ increase for immigrants from the former Soviet Union
who fluently speak Hebrew in 1994. Nevertheless, the results presented here clarify that neglecting
self-selection of employed immigrants leads to biased estimates of the earnings effects.
4.3 Considering self-selection into economic sector and occupation
However, selection into occupation and industrial sector was not regarded explicitly in earlier
studies. Put it in other words, are immigrants with better language proficiency paid better in a
firm than immigrants with poorer language command or do they earn different wages because they
work in different firms and do different jobs? Theory predicts that workers with higher productivity
enter higher paid jobs. Therefore, even having controlled for self-selection into participation and
employment, earnings may be affected by worker’s occupation and economic sector choice. Further,
we distinguish between blue- and white-collar workers and basic/high-tech industry and other
economic sectors. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the language ability variables and
skills for these groups. As it becomes obvious, there is a substantial difference in language ability
(independently whether measured in terms of language usage or self-assessed language proficiency)
between blue-collar and white-collar workers. White-collar workers are more likely to speak mainly
German in the household, be more fluent in German language and be high-skilled. In contrast,
comparing basic and high-tech industry with other industry establishes minor differences only.
Due to these differences, it is reasonable to estimate the separate earnings equations for each of
the four groups: 1. white-collar in basic and high-tech industry, 2. blue-collar in basic and high-
tech industry, 3. white-collar in other industry, and 4. blue-collar in other industry. Each of these
groups is non-random and appropriate correction for self-selection is required (see section A in the
appendix for a description). Estimation is carried out using bivariate probit models on choice of
occupation type and economic sector. Complete estimates are given in Table B.4 in the appendix.
The estimate of the correlation coefficient (ρ) is highly significant, hence, both choices have to
be estimated jointly to avoid selection bias. The estimates of language usage across skill groups
in both equations are summarized in Table 6. The results show that foreigners speaking mainly
German at home have a clearly higher probability to be white-collar workers; speaking partly
German is relevant for the probability of being a white-collar worker for medium-skilled persons.
Having constructed appropriate inverse Mill’s ratios we estimated earnings equations for each
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Tab. 5: Descriptives statistics by occupation and eco-
nomic Sector
Occupation Economic sector
white blue basic & high- other
collar collar tech industry industry
Language usage in the household
Mainly German 0.67 0.29 0.29 0.36
Partly German 0.03 0.24 0.24 0.21
Mainly mother tongue 0.29 0.47 0.48 0.44
Self-reported German language proficiency
Very Good 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.25
Good 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.40
Satisfactory 0.01 0.30 0.31 0.24
Poor 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.11
Not at all 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Level of education
Low skilled 0.21 0.54 0.54 0.49
Medium skilled 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.41
High skilled 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.10
Tab. 6: Language usage effects on occupation and eco-
nomic sector choice across skill groupsa
Occupation choice
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German 0.7715∗∗ 0.7266∗∗ 1.9069#
partly German 0.2800 0.5411∗∗ 0.8115
Economic sector choice
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
mainly German -0.2693 -0.0543∗∗ -0.8583∗
partly German -0.1739 0.1383 -0.4057
# - significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at
10% level
a The complete estimates are given in Table B.4 in the appendix.
group restricting the β-coefficients to be equal across groups (Table B.2, model 3) and for two
groups excluding white-collar workers who are a relatively small group (Table B.2, models 4 and
5). The effects of language usage and skills are summarized in Table 7. Consideration of all groups
points out at a slightly significant effect of language usage on earnings especially for high-skilled
workers. Excluding white-collar workers (156 observations out of 2,021) reduces the magnitude of
the effect and its significance. In fact, none of the coefficients for the language effect on earnings
are significant. This implies that language usage affects earnings of white- and blue-collar workers
differently and occupational heterogeneity of workers should not be neglected. For blue-collar
workers language proficiency does not seem to affect wages directly. It influences wages indirectly
by affecting participation and employment probability as well as occupational choice (white- or
blue-collar occupation). For white-collar workers the results tend to indicate that a wage premium
for language proficiency exists, but given the small number of observations for white-collar workers
we can neither prove it nor disprove.
Although these results are not directly comparable due to differences in the selection criteria of the
sample and the methods used to estimate the effects of occupation on earnings, it may be useful
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Tab. 7: Language usage effects on earnings across skill
groups (additionally controlled for occupation
and economic sector)
low skilled med. skilled high skilled
All groups
mainly German 0.0985∗ 0.1116∗ 0.2690∗∗
partly German -0.0111 0.0854∗ 0.1412∗
Excluding white-collar workers
mainly German 0.0855 0.0905 0.0961
partly German -0.0116 0.0716 0.0932
# - significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at
10% level
to discuss the findings in light of the results of Kossoudji (1988) and Chiswick and Miller (2007a).
In contrast to our results, Kossoudji (1988) finds significant negative effect of language deficiency
on earnings of craft and service personnel (blue-collar occupations). However, the results are not
directly comparable as she analyzes Hispanics and East Asians in the US labor market in the 1970s
which is different to German. On the other hand, selection into participation and employment is
not considered in Kossoudji (1988). Chiswick and Miller (2007a) control for occupational choice
by including dummy variables for different occupations. Their findings suggest that about one half
of the typical earnings differential reported in the literature with respect to language ability can
be attributed to occupational attainment, i.e. workers with better language command enter higher
paid occupations. This is consistent with our finding that controlling for occupation reduces the
observed wage premium for language proficiency. However, unlike Chiswick and Miller (2007a)
we find that for blue-collar workers in Germany the effect of language proficiency on earnings is
to full extent attributed to higher participation and employment rates and better occupational
attainment of persons with better command of German language.
4.4 Language usage vs. language proficiency
So far we have used the information on the language usage in the household as a proxy for actual
language proficiency. However, there may be concerns about the validity of language usage in
the household to approximate the effects of language proficiency. The problem of approximation
of language proficiency by self-assessed variables is common in many studies. For that reason,
different language variables are used (as single variables or combinations). For Germany, e.g.,
Dustmann (1994), uses speaking and writing fluency, Dustmann and van Soest (2001; 2002) use
information on speaking fluency compressed by a dummy instead of a five-scale variable. Other
examples are McManus, Gould, and Welch (1983) who construct a combined indicator derived
from answers to questions on language usage in the household and neighborhood. In a similar
fashion, Chiswick and Miller (1995) and Chiswick and Miller (2007a) use combined information
on language usage in the household and self-assessed speaking fluency. In constrast, Rivera-Batiz
(1990) has access to data on objective test scores of literacy (see above). We have redone our
analysis using information on self-assessed language proficiency to provide a sensitivity analysis
16
of the results discussed so far. Unfortunately, as noted above self-assessed language proficiency is
missing in about half of the observations in our sample.
Denote the latent language proficiency by H. The self-assessed language proficiency is reported in
5 categories: not at all, poor, satisfactory, good, and very good. The probability that an outcome i
is observed is given by:
Pr(O = i) = Pr(κi−1 < H 6 κi), (6)
where κ are the cutoff points and O is the observed self-assessed language proficiency. Equation 6
could be estimated by ordered probit method.14 As a set of explanatory variables we choose age,
time of residence (and the respective squares), skill and year dummies, and language usage in the
household. The estimation results are presented in Table 8. Not surprisingly, persons who speak
mainly German in the household also have better command of German language. Speaking partly
German also increases language proficiency. However, the effect is smaller in magnitude.
Tab. 8: Ordered probit esti-
mates on proficiency
in spoken German lan-
guage
Age -0.0195
Age (squared) -0.0004
Time of residence 0.1223#
Time of residence (squared) -0.0015#
Level of education
Medium skilled 0.1880∗∗
High skilled 0.3897∗∗
Language usage
Mainly German 1.8088#
Partly German 0.8159#
Year dummies YES
κ1 -2.1356
κ2 -0.2985
κ3 1.1160
κ4 2.7256
pseudo R2 0.2338
Observations 1,314
*** - significant at 1% level, ** - at
5% level, * - at 10% level
Using the fitted values Hˆ as a regressor instead of language usage in the household we re-estimate
equations 2, 3, A.1, and extended earnings equation 5. Given the parametric form H = Qη + ζ
we also impute the missing values. Namely, O is observed in only about half of observations, and
hence, ηˆ is obtained from the regression in eq. 6 using non-missing observations in O (half of the
sample). However, once ηˆ is estimated and given that Q is observed for the whole sample, Hˆ = Qηˆ
can be calculated for missing observations as well.
The results for earnings are given in the appendix in Table B.3, the corresponding estimates for
14 Bleakley and Chin (2004) uses IV method to correct for measurement error in the self-assessed language profi-
ciency variable. However, they fail to take into account the ordinal nature of the self-assessed proficiency variable.
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the selection models in Tables B.1 and B.4. Qualitatively the results are similar to the estimates
using language usage in the household. Self-assessed language proficiency significantly increases
participation probability and employment chances especially for the medium- and the high-skilled.
Besides, foreigners with better language proficiency are more likely to be white-collar workers.
Without controlling for selection language proficiency has a significant positive effect on earnings
especially for medium and high skilled persons. Taking selection into participation and employment
into account slightly increases the magnitudes of the effect. However, once additional selection
into economic sector and occupation is considered, the effect of language proficiency on earnings
becomes statistically insignificant for blue-collar workers. In that sense, it could be concluded that
independently of the language variables used, language ability affects the selection processes in the
labor market but a direct effect of language on earnings (as a kind of wage premium) could not be
established.
5 Conclusion
There is quite comprehensive international evidence showing that foreigners speaking the language
of the host country well are better off in terms of earnings than those with poor command. One
of the explanations is a relationship between productivity and language proficiency, and more
productive workers are paid a wage premium. However, this explanation is not easy to reconcile
with the empirical findings due to self-selection of workers.
Put it in other words, are immigrants with better language proficiency paid better in a firm than
immigrants with poorer language command or do they earn different wages because they work
in different firms and do different jobs? To shed more light on this issue we analyze earnings of
foreigners in Germany considering selection of workers into participation, employment, economic
sector, and occupation.
We begin our analysis by building a theoretical model which assumes no wage premium to produc-
tivity (and hence to language proficiency). We show that in the absence of wage premium, language
proficiency heterogeneity would generate differences in participation and employment levels. More-
over, more proficient individuals end up working in higher-paid firms. In the empirical model, we
show that without controlling for self-selection or controlling only for selection into participation
and employment the estimates support the existence of wage premium for language proficiency.
However, once selection into economic sector and occupation is controlled for, no significant effects
of language proficiency on earnings of blue-collar workers are observed. For white-collar workers
no conclusive evidence is found due to small number of observations.
Language proficiency, however, plays an important role at different selection stages. For example,
it significantly increases participation probability and employment chances, especially for the low-
and medium-skilled. Moreover, foreigners with better language command are more likely to be
white-collar workers. This implies that language proficiency only indirectly affects foreigners’ earn-
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ings in Germany through higher participation rate and employment chances and higher likelihood
of working in white-collar occupations. A wage premium per se or a direct effect could not be
established. Using two different measures of language proficiency (language usage in the household
and self-assessed language proficiency) does not change the results qualitatively.
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A Modeling selection into economic sector and occupation
Theory predicts that workers with higher productivity enter higher paid jobs. Therefore, even
having controlled for self-selection into participation and employment, earnings may be affected
by worker’s occupation and economic sector choice. Therefore, we extend our model to explicitly
control for selection through these channels. In the sub-sample of employed persons, we take
account of self-selection into the economic sector modeled as the probability of working in basic
or high tech industry and of self-selection into occupation modeled as the probability of being
a white-collar worker. Analogously to our empirical model discussed in section 2.2, we consider
both choices as joint decisions in a first step. Assuming joint normality of the errors, estimation
is carried out using a bivariate probit model.
However, one needs to keep in mind that participation-employment decision is a double-hurdle, i.e.
employment decision is observed only for participating individuals. In case of occupation-industry
decision all combinations are observed: 1. white-collar in basic and high tech industry, 2. blue-
collar in basic and high tech industry, 3. white-collar in other industry, and 4. blue-collar in other
industry. Let the two choices be modeled as:
I3 = Z3γ3 + 3
I4 = Z4γ4 + 4,
with cov(3, 4) = ρ2 and I3 being an indicator variable taking the value one if a person is a white-
collar worker and I4 being an indicator variable taking the value one if a person is employed in
basic or high-tech industry. There is an earnings equation defined for each group (see Fishe, Trost,
and Lurie (1981)):
w1 = X1β1 + u1 if I3 = 1, I4 = 1
w2 = X2β2 + u2 if I3 = 0, I4 = 1
w3 = X3β3 + u3 if I3 = 1, I4 = 0 (A.1)
w4 = X4β4 + u4 if I3 = 0, I4 = 0.
It is assumed that uk∈K withK = {1, 2...4} is jointly distributed with 3 and 4 with E(uk∈K`∈L) =
σk` where L = {1, 2}. Since w1 is observed only if I3 = 1, I4 = 1 then E(w1|I3 = 1, I4 = 1) =
X1βˆ1 + E(u1|I3 = 1, I4 = 1). It is shown in Fishe, Trost, and Lurie (1981):
E(u1|I3 = 1, I4 = 1) = σ13M12 + σ14M21
E(u2|I3 = 0, I4 = 1) = σ23M34 + σ24M43
E(u3|I3 = 1, I4 = 0) = σ33M56 + σ34M65 (A.2)
E(u4|I3 = 0, I4 = 0) = σ43M78 + σ44M87.
The Ms are Mills ratios adjusted for bivariate case. The general formula for calculating Ms is
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Mij = (1− ρ22)−1(Pi − ρ2Pj) with P s defined by the following equation:
P1 =
∫ Z4γ4
−∞
∫ Z3γ3
−∞ 3f(34)d3d4
F (Z3γ3, Z4γ4)
, P2 =
∫ Z3γ3
−∞
∫ Z4γ4
−∞ 4f(34)d4d3
F (Z3γ3, Z4γ4)
,
P3 =
∫ Z4γ4
−∞
∫∞
Z3γ3
3f(34)d3d4
F (−Z3γ3, Z4γ4) , P4 =
∫∞
Z3γ3
∫ Z3γ4
−∞ 4f(34)d4d3
F (−Z3γ3, Z4γ4) , (A.3)
P5 =
∫∞
Z4γ4
∫ Z3γ3
−∞ 3f(34)d3d4
F (Z3γ3,−Z4γ4) , P6 =
∫ Z3γ3
−∞
∫∞
Z4γ4
4f(34)d4d3
F (Z3γ3,−Z4γ4) ,
P7 =
∫∞
Z4γ4
∫∞
Z3γ3
3f(34)d3d4
F (−Z3γ3,−Z4γ4) , P8 =
∫∞
Z3γ3
∫∞
Z4γ4
4f(34)d4d3
F (−Z3γ3,−Z4γ4) .
The P s can be interpreted as conditional expectations of errors in equation (A.1) as E(3|I3 =
1, I4 = 1) =
∫ Z4γ4
−∞
∫ Z3γ3
−∞ 3f(34)d3d4
F (Z3γ3, Z4γ4)
= P1 and so on. Equation A.3 can still be evaluated
numerically. In fact, the term M12 and M21 are calculated by the same token as λ1 and λ2 for
which the numerical evaluation is straightforward. Other terms are calculated in the same fashion.
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B Tables
Tab. B.1: Selection model: results for separate estimation of partici-
pation and employment decision
Language usage Language proficiency
Part. Emp. Part. Emp.
Constant 0.5768 -0.0377 0.5887 -0.0094
Age 0.0055 0.0401 0.0150 -0.0495
Age(squared) 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005
Time of residence 0.0068 0.0275∗∗ -0.0251 0.0000
Time of residence(squared) -0.0002 -0.0004∗ 0.0001 -0.0003
Level of Education (Ref. low skilled)a
Medium skilled -3.7063∗ -3.8598 -2.7681∗ -3.9856∗
High skilled -0.3958 3.8949 0.5533 -1.3900
Language Usage (Ref. mainly mother tongue)b
Mainly German 0.3511∗ 0.5653# — —
Partly German 0.3248# 0.3193∗∗ — —
Language Proficiency — — 0.2124∗∗ 0.3193#
Exclusion Restrictions (Participation)
Married 0.4741∗∗ — 0.4835∗∗∗ —
Children -0.2159 — -0.2172 —
Interactions
Medium skilled*age 0.1702∗ 0.2222∗ 0.1653∗ 0.2160∗
Medium skilled*age (squared) -0.0024∗ -0.0029∗ -0.0024∗ -0.0028∗
High skilled*age -0.0001 0.1138 -0.0704 0.1097
High skilled*age(squared) 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0012 -0.0016
Mainly German*Medium skilled 0.2500 0.3752∗ — —
Mainly German*High skilled 0.4260 -0.4192 — —
Partly German*Medium skilled 0.0029 0.1518 — —
Partly German*High skilled 0.2521 -0.3770 — —
Language Proficiency*Medium skilled — — 0.0952 0.1969
Language Proficiency*High skilled — — 0.3106∗ -0.1225
Linear combinations Medium-skilled
Mainly German 0.6010∗∗∗ 0.9404# — —
Partly German 0.3277∗∗ 0.4711# — —
Language Proficiency — — 0.3076∗∗∗ 0.5162#
Linear combinations High-skilled
Mainly German 0.7771∗ 0.1461 — —
Partly German 0.5769 -0.0576 — —
Language Proficiency — — 0.5230∗∗∗ 0.1968
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,830 2,575 2,830 2,575
pseudo R2 0.0534 0.0770 0.0533 0.0784
All estimates are displayed in terms of coefficients. Significance is indicated as follows:
# denoting the 0.1%, ∗∗∗ the 1%, ∗∗ the 5% and ∗ the 10% level.
a Medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with ad-
vanced technical college or university degree.
b Language proficiency is estimated by the ordered probit regression. See section 4.4 for
details.
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Tab. B.2: Earnings equation and language usage in the householda
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 1.6260# 1.5633# 1.4986# 1.5469# 1.5264#
Age 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗ 0.0310∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.0301∗∗
Age(squared) -0.0003∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004∗∗
Time of residence 0.0135 0.0150# 0.0188# 0.0156# 0.0182#
Time of residence(squared) -0.0002∗∗ -0.0002∗∗ -0.0003# -0.0003# -0.0003#
Level of Educationb(Ref. low skilled)
Medium skilled -0.0085 0.0003 0.0003 0.0070 0.0018
High skilled -0.0920 -0.0609 -2.0326 -0.0716 -0.0609
Language usage (Ref. mainly mother tongue)
Mainly German 0.0531∗ 0.0750 0.0985∗ 0.0921∗ 0.0855
Partly German -0.0226 -0.0171 -0.0111 -0.0084 -0.0116
Sector (Ref. industry & manufacturing)
Transportation -0.1264# -0.1254# -0.0596 -0.1423# -0.0587
Construction -0.0092 -0.0082∗∗ 0.0664∗∗ -0.0092 0.0725∗∗
Trading services -0.1218# -0.1206# -0.0763 -0.1536# -0.0724∗
Social services and health -0.0874∗∗ -0.0899∗∗ -0.0517 -0.1172∗∗ -0.0343∗
Firm size (Ref. < 20 employees )
20 - 199 employees 0.0996# 0.0994# 0.0983 0.1019# 0.0991#
200 - 1999 employees 0.1917# 0.1923# 0.1822# 0.1817# 0.1730#
2000 and more employees 0.2466# 0.2454# 0.2311# 0.2441# 0.2311#
Locationc(Ref. south )
North -0.0102 -0.0116 -0.0185 -0.0110 -0.0186
Center -0.0335∗ 0.2868∗ -0.0315 -0.0356∗ -0.0306
Interactions
Mainly German*Medium skilled 0.0177 0.0106 0.0131 0.0016 0.0050
Mainly German*High skilled 0.3326# 0.2868∗∗ 0.1706 0.0331 0.0106
Partly German*Medium skilled 0.0750∗∗ 0.0789∗∗ 0.0965∗∗ 0.0737∗∗ 0.0832∗∗
Partly German*High skilled 0.1931∗∗ 0.1603∗∗ 0.1524∗ 0.1216 0.1047
Linear combinations Medium-skilled
Mainly German 0.0709∗∗ 0.0855 0.1116∗ 0.0937 0.0905
Partly German 0.0525∗ 0.0617∗ 0.0854∗ 0.0653 0.0716
Linear combinations High-skilled
Mainly German 0.3857# 0.3618# 0.2690∗∗ 0.1253 0.0961
Partly German 0.1706∗∗ 0.1431∗ 0.1412∗ 0.1131 0.0932
Selection termsd
λ1 (Participation) — 0.2105 0.2762 0.2823 0.3023
λ2 (Employment) — -0.2263 -0.2704
∗ -0.2498∗ -0.2822∗
M1 — — 0.0374∗ — —
M2 — — -0.0678 — —
M3 — — -0.2227 — -0.0162
M4 — — 0.0763 — 0.0497
M5 — — -0.0845 — —
M6 — — 0.3124 — —
M7 — — -0.1343∗ — 0.0130
M8 — — -0.0509 — -0.0742∗
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,021 1,865 1,865
R2 .2894 .2915 .3264 .2789 .2908
Significance is indicated as follows:# denoting the 0,1%, ∗∗∗ denoting the 1.0%, ∗∗ the 5%
and ∗ the 10% level.
a Model 1 - no selection control; Model 2 - controlling for selection into participation and
employment; Model 3 - additional controls for selection into economic sector and occupation;
Model 4 - excluding white-collar workers, controlling for selection into participation and
employment; Model 5 - excluding white-collar workers, additional controls for selection into
economic sector and occupation.
b Medium skilled are people with professional training, high skilled are people with advanced
technical college or university degree.
c North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen,
and Berlin. Center are the Federal States North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
and Saarland. South comprises Hessen, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg.
d λ1 and λ2 are calculated using estimates for the participation and employment given in
Table B.1.
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Tab. B.3: Earnings equation and self-assessed language proficiencya
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 1.6306# 1.6594# 1.5863# 1.6172# 1.6215#
Age 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ 0.0288∗∗ 0.0286∗∗ 0.0276∗∗
Age(squared) -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗
Time of residence 0.0073 0.0081 0.0109 0.0091∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
Time of residence(squared) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002∗∗ -0.0002∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
Level of Educationb(Ref. low skilled)
Medium skilled 0.0057 0.0137 0.0110 0.0134 0.0126
High skilled -0.1412∗∗ -0.1255 -0.0846 -0.0473 -0.0413
Language usage
Language Proficiency 0.0297∗∗ 0.0315 0.0441∗ 0.0346∗ 0.0313
Sector (Ref. industry & manufacturing)
Transportation -0.1286# -0.1278# -0.0601∗ -0.1415# -0.0567∗
Construction -0.0110 -0.0097 0.0683∗∗ -0.0092 0.0743∗∗
Trading services -0.1230# -0.1219# -0.0744∗ -0.1511# -0.0691∗
Social services and health -0.0746∗ -0.0756∗ -0.0411 -0.1514 -0.0299
Firm size (Ref. < 20 employees )
20 - 199 employees 0.1038# 0.1041# 0.1024# 0.1057# 0.1028#
200 - 1999 employees 0.1939# 0.1946# 0.1847# 0.1862# 0.1767#
2000 and more employees 0.2460# 0.2453# 0.2330# 0.2473# 0.2346#
Locationc(Ref. south )
North -0.0081 -0.0099 -0.0168 -0.0103 -0.0177
Center -0.0348∗ -0.0367∗ -0.0323∗ -0.0362∗ -0.0325∗
Interactions
Language Proficiency*Medium skilled 0.0131 0.0088 0.0166 0.0088 0.0093
Language Proficiency*High skilled 0.1401# 0.1276# 0.1167∗ 0.0205 0.0150
Linear combinations Medium-skilled
Language Proficiency 0.0428∗∗ 0.0403 0.0978∗∗∗ 0.0455 0.0406
Linear combinations High-skilled
Language Proficiency 0.1699# 0.1591# 0.0608∗ 0.0572 0.0463
Selection termsd
λ1 (Participation) — 0.0959 0.1569 0.1578 0.1644
λ2 (Employment) — -0.1896 -0.2141 -0.2005 -0.2304
M1 — — -0.1066 — —
M2 — — -0.0649 — —
M3 — — -0.2861 — 0.0041
M4 — — 0.0602 — 0.0022
M5 — — 0.1429 — —
M6 — — -0.0992 — —
M7 — — -0.1931∗ — -0.0010
M8 — — -0.0619 — -0.0899∗
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,021 1,865 1,865
R2 .2906 .2921 .3231 .2728 .2855
Significance is indicated as follows: # denoting the 0,1%, ∗∗∗ denoting the 1.0%, ∗∗ the 5% and ∗
the 10% level.
a Model 1 - no selection control; Model 2 - controlling for selection into participation and employment;
Model 3 - additional controls for selection into economic sector and occupation; Model 4 - excluding
white-collar workers, controlling for selection into participation and employment; Model 5 - excluding
white-collar workers, additional controls for selection into economic sector and occupation.
b Medium skilled are people with professional training, high skilled are people with advanced technical
college or university degree.
c North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen, and
Berlin. Center are the Federal States North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland.
South comprises Hessen, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg.
d λ1 and λ2 are calculated using estimates of the participation and employment equation given in
Table B.1.
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Tab. B.4: Selection model: results for joint estimation of occupation
type and economic sectora
language language language language
usage proficiency usage proficiency
Type of occupation Economic Sector
Constant -2.8096 -2.2869 -1.6932∗∗ -1.6898∗∗
Age -0.0045 -0.0378 0.0663 0.0632
Age(squared) 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008
Time of residence 0.1095∗∗ 0.0387 0.0380∗ 0.0553∗∗
Time of residence(squared) -0.0012 -0.0003∗ -0.0008∗∗ -0.0010∗∗
Level of education (Ref. low skilled)b
Medium skilled 0.1578 0.1192 -0.2533 -0.1560∗
High skilled 0.9728 -0.1912∗∗ -0.0035 0.0113∗
Language usage (Ref. mainly mother tongue)c
Mainly German 0.7715∗∗ — -0.2693 —
Partly German 0.2800 — -0.1739 —
Language proficiency — 0.3083∗ — -0.1327∗
Interactions
Mainly German*medium skilled -0.0448 — 0.2150 —
Mainly German*high skilled 1.1354∗ — -0.5889 —
Partly German*medium skilled 0.2610 — 0.3122 —
Partly German*high skilled 0.5314 — -0.2317 —
Language proficiency*medium skilled — 0.0400 — 0.0871
Language proficiency*high skilled — 0.8473∗∗∗ — -0.1633
Linear combinations medium-skilled
Mainly German 0.7266∗∗ — -0.0543∗∗ —
Partly German 0.5411∗∗ — 0.1383 —
Language proficiency — 0.3483∗∗ — -0.0727
Linear combinations high-skilled
Mainly German 1.9069# — -0.8583∗ —
Partly German 0.8115 — -0.4057 —
Language proficiency — 1.1557# — -0.1598∗
Exclusion restriction (Ref. north)c
Center 0.5218∗∗ 0.5174∗∗
South 0.2035 0.2008
ρ -0.4470# -0.5521#
Observations 2,021 2,021
All estimates are displayed in terms of coefficients. Significance is indicated as follows:
# denoting the 0.1%, ∗∗∗ the 1%, ∗∗ the 5% and ∗ the 10% level.
a medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with ad-
vanced technical college or university degree.
b Language proficiency is estimated by the ordered probit regression. See section 4.4 for
details.
c North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bre-
men, and Berlin. Center are the Federal States North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-
Palatinate, and Saarland. South comprises Hessen, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg.
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